6.8 KiB
Offline release tooling
This package is an operator composition tool. policy validates delivery bounds,
manifest inventories/verifies explicit files, and build runs the locked trusted
checkout build and copies only tracked application/deployment sources, fresh
production dependencies and separately fingerprinted public runtime inputs.
It does not import domain ORM/repositories, write application state, implement a
second migration path, execute student code or perform Sandbox privilege work.
scripts/check_architecture.py enforces its application import boundary.
All dependency resolution for a release uses existing lockfiles and offline caches. Backend source is shipped with locked production dependencies rather than invoking an unpinned isolated wheel build backend. uvx/pip and package startup path hooks are not delivery runtime entry points. Build inputs specify a verified public runtime inventory and the three existing image catalogs; an independent expected SHA-256 binds each input. Real input paths/receipts are local operator data and do not belong in Git.
python3.13 -m scripts.release build --repo /native/checkout \
--inputs /private/build-inputs.json --output /private/new-bundle \
--work /private/new-build-work
The checkout must be clean and committed, build output/work directories new,
and the output filesystem have the required reserve. The resulting receipt
contains the source and manifest fingerprints, file count and byte total, with
installed=false and execution_verified=false. Installation and service
acceptance remain separate operations. See deploy/release/README.md for the
versioned installation contract and authority split.
preflight reads installation eligibility only. install-files requires root,
a completely root-controlled verified input tree and the fixed target profile;
it installs protected versions/images and bounded OS identities, without table
migrations, application accounts, services or the active-version switch.
Repeated identical files converge; unknown modes/owners, changed bytes or an
incomplete staging directory require operator inspection and are never removed.
generate-configuration composes exact public contracts with separately supplied
0600 node and endpoint inputs. It emits a new private directory and a hash-bound
receipt, never prints tokens, never changes a supplied password and never silently
overwrites an earlier identity. API, publisher, import, migration and identity
operations have distinct required database authority; Worker holds only its own
MQ/control identity, Root receives no business credentials. Backend URLs use the
existing asyncpg driver. No uvx/pip or online runtime installation is used.
install-configuration validates the entire group before writing any member;
check-configuration checks installed bytes, same-source admission, identity and
hardware/kernel/node scheduler bindings. activate requires that check and
stopped control ports, no factory socket and no retained task/identity/capture
resources. It atomically selects an installed directory and starts no process;
draining, migrations and actual health remain separate operations. It does not
erase retained journals or release resources lacking cleanup proof.
Every private group also has a content-bound configuration_id. Installing a
second group for the same source preserves the first group byte-for-byte.
activate RELEASE --manifest-sha256 SHA --configuration-id BATCH selects an
explicit validated batch only after ordinary application units and independent
task resources are stopped. check-active checks the protected batch/code
binding and current measurement snapshot, with no liveness/readiness claim.
provision-database-identities is an explicit local database operator step.
It uses the locked asyncpg dependency, bounded connections/statements and a
120-second overall deadline. It installs only fixed independent logins/NOLOGIN
groups and the application database, verifies every supplied credential and
refuses unexpected existing authority. There is no application table DDL or
automatic account bootstrap: the migration login owns the database without
global superuser/create-role/create-db/bypass-RLS rights; Backend Alembic remains
the only schema/grant migration entry. Runtime logins cannot grant/set group
authority. See PostgreSQL role membership
and function ownership.
Always bootstrap validation from a separately trusted tool copy and an out-of-band
manifest SHA. Do not execute a checker supplied inside an unverified bundle to
establish trust in that same bundle. A verified delivery includes bin/kf-delivery
and its source for later offline operations. Command success/receipt generation
does not claim Linux execution, working service roles or installation acceptance;
these require the recorded independent VM evidence.
generate-proxy is a separate, offline composition entry. Its private 0600
profile has exactly schema_version: 1, one canonical HTTPS DNS origin,
certificate_sha256 and key_sha256. TLS inputs are independently supplied
later at /etc/kf-onlinejudge/tls/fullchain.pem and key.pem; the generator
does not read, create or verify a private key. It emits a new private NGINX
configuration and receipt tied to the verified release. No arbitrary upstream,
include, path, credentials or resource overrides are accepted. Only browser API
families target the API loopback port; execution-control paths are refused. ZIP
uploads have their own canonical UUID route. Syntax, actual TLS/stream limits,
static routes, permissions and service health require subsequent VM acceptance;
the generator explicitly returns those capabilities as unverified.
The separately installed kf-proxy worker identity must be distinct from API,
Coordinator, import, judging and database/broker identities. It has no business
credentials; generation alone never creates that account or starts NGINX.
Operator responsibilities are separate: build/verify are read-only with respect to system state; preflight observes eligibility; file/config installation and activation require the root operator; DB provisioning requires a separately supplied local DB operator; schema/grants and first account use the existing Backend Alembic/account CLIs. Configuration validation never starts or restarts a service. The later bounded service lifecycle must prove drain/cleanup before maintenance; none of these entries authorizes a Sandbox isolation bypass or silently substitutes a healthy result when lifecycle evidence is absent.
Proxy directive references: NGINX core, proxy module, and TLS module.